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In recent years, the Supreme Court's approach to civil
rights law has engendered trepidation in the civil rights community. The most glaring example of the Court's approach to civil
rights law was its sua sponte re-argument order in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union.' The only issue that was presented by
-
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1. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). In its re-argument order, the Court directed the parties to
respond to the following question: "Whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. $ 1981
adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be reconsidered." Id at 171. In Runyon, the Court decided that 42 U.S.C. $ 1981, which provides, in
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the Court's re-argument order was whether 42 U.S.C.8 1981
was enacted pursuant to Congress's Thirteenth2 or Fourteenth
Amendment3 power^.^ Ultimately, the Court afbned its ruling
pertinent part, that blacks had "the same right . .. to make and enforce contracts . ..as is
enjoyed by white citizens," was enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the Thirteenth
Amendment and, therefore, could be used as the basis for a claim against solely private
actors. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976).
2. Sections 1 and 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment provide:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime . . . shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONS. amend. XIII, $5 1, 2.
3. Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provide:
~edtion1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

. .. .

Section 5. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONS. amend. XIV, $0 1,s.
4. The question of the source of Congress's power to enact civil rights laws is critical
because under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to reach private actors.
The Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), said that Congress had
the power under the Thirteenth Amendment to "rationally . . . determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into
effective legislation." Id at 440. Relying on the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the
Court held that Co-ngresshad the power to enact laws to prohibit private individuals from
engaging in acts of racial discrimination. Jones, 392 U.S. at 438-39.
In contrast, Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to situations wherein the action that results in the deprivation of constitutional rights can be traced
to a state actor. Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, stated
that:
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. ..is prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory upon the States.

....
. . . CT]he last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to
enforce it by appropriate legislation. . . .[Congress may] adopt appropriate legislation correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus
to render them effectually null, void and innocuous. . . . [Sluch legislation must
. . .be predicated upon. ..State laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the

correction of their operation and effect.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10-12. Thus, if the Court had decided in Patterson that
Runyon had been incorrectly decided and that the statute in question was enacted pursuant
solely to Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment, then the scope of $ 1981
would be limited to remedying deprivations of the right to contract on the basis of race
wherein state laws or officials connected with the state had denied blacks the right to
contract.
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in Runyon v. McCrary,' despite the view of certain members that
Runyon had been decided in~orrectly,~
and held that 5 1981 was
enacted pursuant to Congress's Thirteenth Amendment powers.'
Notwithstanding the reaffirmance of Runyon, civil rights
scholars and lawyers are still concerned about the Court's
approach to civil rights. Their anxiety over the Court's
approach may increase during the October 1991 Term of the
Court. During that term, the Court will again have the opportunity to unsettle an entire body of civil rights law when it reexamines another post-Civil War civil rights statute-42 U.S.C.
5 1985(3)*-the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic presents the Court with the opportunity
to revisit that statute in a slightly unusual context. In Bray, several abortion clinics and abortion rights organizations applied
for permanent injunctions to enjoin an anti-abortion organization and its members from "trespassing on, blockading, impeding, or obstructing ingress to or egress from" facilities providing
abortion services.1° The district court held that the blockading
of abortion facilities by the defendants infringed upon the constitutional right to travel of women seeking to obtain abortions at
5. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).

6. Justices Breman, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented from this part of the
opinion. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 189 (1989).
7. Id at 171-75.
8. Section 1985(3) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Temtory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Temtory from
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Temtory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his
support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any
lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a
Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or
property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set
forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. 8 1985(3) (1988).
9. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 E2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
10. Id. at 584.

Heinonline - - 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1359 1991-1992

TULANE LAW REVIEW

1360

pol. 66

clinics in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area in violation
of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3).11 The.Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's issuance of a permanent injunction on the ground
. that the activities of the defendants "had crossed the line from
persuasion into coercion and operated to deny the exercise of
rights protected by law."12 The court also affirmed the district
court's holdings that "gender-based animus satisfie[d] the 'purpose' element of 1985(3)" and that blocking abortion facilities
which serve an interstate clientele violates the constitutional
right to travel.13
The Court in Bray will have the opportunity to decide several key issues regarding the coverage of 1985(3). One issue is
whether women or women seeking an abortion constitute a class
under the statute. Another issue is whether private actors can
violate the federal constitutional right to interstate travel when
they hinder access to abortion clinics. Those are the nominal
issues that the Court can be expected to address; however, there
are broader issues that an activist Court may reach out to
answer, as the current Court attempted to do in Patterson.
Those issues could involve a question similar to the one raised in
the Patterson re-argument order: whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) adopted by the Court in Grznn v.
Breckenridge l4 should be reconsidered.
In Grznn, the Court effectively reversed its prior determination of the elements needed for a claim under § 1985(3) and
the source of Congress's power to enact the statute. Previously,
in ColIins v. Hardyman,l5 the Court held that fj 1985(3) was
enacted pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers
and thus could only reach deprivations of constitutional rights
by state actors.16 In GrzBn, the Court stated that private actors
could be held liable under § 1985(3) and that Congress had the
power to sanction private discrimination under the Thirteenth
Amendment.17 Given the apparent conflict between the two
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id
Id at 585.
Id.
403 U.S. 88 (1971).
341 U.S. 651 (1951).
Id at 657-59.
Griffin,403 U.S. at 105. The Court held that "Congress was wholly within its

powers under . . . the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause of action for
Negro citizens who have been the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private
action aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men." Id.
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cases regarding the scope of 8 1985(3) and the constitutional
power that Congress exercised when it enacted the statute, the
Court in Bray may be presented with another opportunity to
thwart the Reconstruction Congress's efforts to provide a federal
remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights by private citizens or organizations.
A review of the legislative history of 8 1985(3) reveals that
Congress's purpose in enacting the statute was to provide a federal remedy for the deprivation of the newly acquired constitutional rights of the freed slaves and other classes of persons
whose rights were being denied by terrorist organizations
because of their political views. The debates are replete with references to the violence and brutality directed at these classes of
citizens and the complete failure of state or local officials to take
any steps to remedy this situation. In addition, the members of
the forty-second Congress were concerned about the rights and
safety of southern-born white citizens who had supported the
federal government and of northerners who had moved to the
South after the Civil War in an effort to rebuild that war-torn
region. The legislative record is full of examples of violence and
intimidation directed at those two classes of white citizens. In
short, the evil that Congress sought to address was wanton violence directed at black and white citizens at the hands of private,
marauding, masked organizations. With respect to which rights
Congress sought to protect under the statute, the legislative history reveals that when Congress used the term "privileges and
immunities" in 8 1985(3), it intended that all rights which the
Constitution afforded to United States citizens were to be
included within the penumbra of 5 1985(3). As to the source of
Congress's power to enact this law, the debates show that the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were looked
to as authorization for the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871.
Finally, an analysis of the legislative history demonstrates
that both Collins and Gr13n unduly restricted the scope of
5 1985(3). Collins restricted the statute to incidents solely
involving state actors.'* Grzpn limited the statute to cases in
which a racially discriminatory, class-based animus was present,19 thereby making it uncertain whether classes other than
18. Collins,341 U.S. at 659.
19. Grzsn, 403 U.S. at 102.
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racial groups could sue under the statute. The Court in Bray
will have the chance to address these issues and to resolve the
questions left unanswered in Grz3n.
In Part I1 of this Article, the legislative history of the Act is
scrutinized to determine the factual predicate that led to the
enactment of 5 1985(3) and the classes Congress sought to protect under its provisions. The legislative history is also analyzed
to determine which rights Congress sought to protect in
§ 1985(3). Part I11 discusses the Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the statute and attempts to provide guidance as to the
proper outcome in Bray.

11. THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSETO THE
Ku KLUXKLAN
A. The Evil To Be Remedied
The impetus for the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was a
request by President Grant for additional legislation to deal with
the growing crisis in the southern states.20 Several issues emerge
from the message Grant sent to Congress. First, a breakdown of
law and order existed in the southern states, which endangered
life and limb. Second, the state governments were powerless to
remedy this emergency. Third, Grant did not believe that he
legally had the authority to intervene. The state of affairs that
Grant wanted addressed resulted from the resistance mounted
by former Confederate soldiers and slave masters to the emancipation of the slaves, the political alliance between the freed persons and the Republican Party, and the 'destruction of the
southern "way of life."21 On March 28, 1871, in response to
Grant's request for additional legislation, Representative Samuel
20. On March 23, 1871, President Grant sent the following message to Congress:
A condition of affairs now exists in some of the States of the Union rendering l i e
and property insecure . . . . The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in
some localities is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is
beyond the control of the State authorities I do not doubt that the power of the
Executive of the United States, acting withim the limits of existing laws, is sufEcient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore I urgently recommend such
legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure lie, liberty, and
property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States.
President Grant's Message to Congress, CONG.GLOBE,42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (Mar. 23,
1871).
21. See generally W.E. BURGHARDTDU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION
IN
AMERICA(1935); JOHN H. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTERTHE CIVIL WAR
(Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1961); KENNETHSTAMPP,THEERAOF RECONSTRUCTION:
18651877 (1965).
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Shellabarger introduced House Bill 320, which was entitled "An
Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, and for Other P~rposes."~~
22. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C.

$8 1983, 1985 (1988)). Section one of the bid provided a remedy for persons whose constitutional rights had been violated by individuals acting under the color of law. That section

was later codified at 42 U.S.C. $1983. Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1289 (1979). As
originally introduced, section two provided criminal penalties in cases of conspiracies to
violate constitutional rights by committing the crimes of murder, robbery, assault and battery and other crimes. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22,17 Stat. 13,13 (1871). On April 5,1871,
Shellabarger introduced an amended version of section two that provided:
That if two or more persons within any State or Temtory of the United States
shall conspire together to overthrow, or to put down, or to destroy by force the
Government of the United States, or to levy war against the United States, or to
oppose by force the authority of the Government of the United States, or by force,
intimidation, or threat to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the
United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United
States against the will and contrary to the authority of the United States, or by
force, intimidation, or threat to prevent any person from accepting or holding any
office of trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging
the duties thereof, or by force, intimidation, or threat to induce any officer of the
United States to leave any State, district, or place where his duties as such officer
might lawfully be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on
account of his l a d l discharge of the duties of his office, or by force, intirnidation, or threat to deter any witness in any court of the United States from testifying in any matter pending in such court fully, freely, and truthfully, or to injure
any such witness in his person or property on account of his having so testified, or
by force, intimidation, or threat to in!luence the verdict of any juror in any court
of the United States, or to injure such person in his person or property on account
of any verdict lawfully assented to by him, or shall conspire together for the purpose, either directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the
laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of
any State from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal protection of the laws, or to injure any person in his person or property for lawfully
enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the
laws, each and every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high crime,
and, upon conviction thereof in any district or circuit court of the United States,
or district or supreme court of any Temtory of the United States having jurisdiction of similar offenses, shall be punished by a h e not less than $500 nor more
than $5,000, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, as the court may
determine, for a period of not less than six months nor more than six years, as the
court may determine, or by both such h e and imprisonment as the court shall
determine; and if any one or more persons engaged in such conspiracy, such as is
defined in the preceding section, shall do or cause to be done any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the person so injured or deprived of such rights and
privileges may have and maintain an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation of rights and privileges against any one or
more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy, such action to be prosecuted in
the proper district or circuit court of the United States, with and subject to the
same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in l i e
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Throughout the debate on the bill, the speakers discussed
the evidence and nature of the problem that the Klan and similar organizations presented. The incidents graphically demonstrated the evil that the Klan represented, its purposes, and the
methods used to effectuate its ends. The evidence revealed that
the Klan used violence and terror against blacks, supporters of
blacks, and Republicans in an effort to undo the gains of the
Reconstruction era. The Klan also directed its anger at
northerners (carpetbaggers) who had come south after the war
and at native southerners (scalawags) who supported the Reconstruction policies of the federal government. In addition, by
using the same tactics against government officials, the Klan
sought to supplant state and local governments. In some
instances, those officials either acquiesced or conspired with the
Klan. Finally, the Klan vented its fury on indicia of federal
authority.
With respect to the purpose of the Klan, Representative
William Stoughton canvassed the available evidence23about the
Klan in North Carolina. He stated that the Klan had a political
purpose and was composed of members of the Democratic and
Conservative Parties.24 It used murders, whippings, intimidation, and violence in pursuit of its political objectives. Stoughton
contended that no Klansmen in North Carolina had been convicted of a crime.25 He explained this by observing that a
cases in such courts under the provisions of the act of April 9, 1866, entitled "An
act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish
the means for their vindication."
CONG.GLOBE,42d Cong., 1st Sess. 477 (1871) [hereinafter CONG.GLOBE].Section three
gave the President the right to dispatch federal troops to deal with violence when a state
was unable to protect its citizens from lawlessness. Id at 317. Section four empowered the
President to declare martial law when a state government was supplanted by an armed
assemblage or when the state conspired with such groups to deprive citizens of constitutional rights. Id
23. There were no evidentiary hearings held prior to the introduction of the Ku Klux
Klan Act. Congress relied on a report issued by a Select Committee of the Senate to Investigate Alleged Outrages in the Southern States. See S. REP. NO. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1871). While the Committee was established to examine the existence of the Klan in the
southern states, it was only able to investigate conditions in North Carolina. The report
concluded that the Klan was responsible for numerous murders, whippings, and shootings
in that State. Regarding the purpose of the Klan, the report found that the Klan was
opposed to the policies of Reconstruction, including the enfranchisement of blacks. See
EVERETTE
SWINNEY,
SUPPRESSING
THE KU KLUXKLAN:THEENFORCEMENT
OF THE
RECONSTRU~~ION
AMENDMENTS
1870-1877 (1987); ALLENW. TRELEASE,
WHITE
TERROR, THE KU KLUXKLANCONSPIRACY
AND SOUTHERN
RECONSTRUCTION
(1971).
24. CONG.GLOBE,supra note 22, at 320.
25. Id.

1
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Klansman was required to commit perjury if called as a witness
in the trial of a fellow traveler and to vote to acquit, notwithstanding the evidence, if selected as a juror in cases involving
Klan~men.~~
In support of his assertions, Stoughton relied on the testimony of James E. Boyd before the Senate Select Committee.
Boyd was a lawyer, former Confederate soldier, and a Klansman
from Alamance County, North Car~lina.~'He testified that the
Klan's purpose was to defeat the Reconstruction policy of Congress and to prevent blacks from voting.28 He further testified
that the Klan was supportive of the policies of the Democratic
Party.29 Regarding the membership of the Klan, Boyd stated
that the majority consisted of former Confederate soldiers and
that it was a well-organized, paramilitary-type organi~ation.~~
Boyd averred that the Klan used any means necessary to carry
out its objectives, including murder.31 He stated that there were
forty thousand members of the Klan in North C a r ~ l i n a . ~ ~
Representative Garfield, who shared Stoughton's views of
the purpose of the Klan, stated:
To state the case in the most moderate terms, it appears that in
some of the southern States there exists a wide spread secret
organization, whose members are bound together by solemn
oaths to prevent certain classes of citizens of the United States
from enjoying these new rights conferred upon them by the
Constitution and laws; that they are putting into execution
their design of preventing such citizens from enjoying the free
right of the ballot box and other privileges and immunities of
citizens, and from enjoying the equal protection of the laws.33

Other speakers in the House supported the thesis that the Klan
was a covert, terrorist organization designed to eliminate the
gains of Reconstr~ction.~~
26. Id
27. Id.
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id.
32. I d ; see also SWINNEY,
supra note 23, at 132-33.
33. CONG.GLOBE,supra note 22, app., at 153.
34. Representative George F. Hoar suggested that the Klan was attempting to restore
the state of affairs that existed before the Civil War.
In many States of this Union, ever since they came into existence as part of the
Union, all rights, civil, political, and personal, have been denied to one part of
their population. So far was there from being any tendency to correct this evil. . .
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In the Senate, similar views about the aim of the Klan were
expressed. Senator John Pool stated that the North Carolina
Klan had between forty and sixty thousand members and that its
members were ordered by the organization to commit crimes in
furtherance of its ~bjectives.~~
Senator Oliver P. Morton
believed that the purpose of the Klan was to use terror and violence to intimidate blacks and others from supporting the
Republican Party and its political ~bjectives.~~
The proponents of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 relied on
evidence which revealed that the Klan was a paramilitary organization that used violence to achieve its political objectives. The
victims of that violence were blacksY3'supporters of
that the civil right of discussing. ..the rightfulness. ..of this state of things and
the political right of voting to put an end to it was also denied, with penalty of
banishment or death to any person of the dominant race whose sense of public
duty might so incline him. It is true this penalty was not expressed in terms on
the statute-books; but it was executed by the mob .. . . [Wlhen it was found that
the association under the General Government with other States where attachment to civil liberty prevailed endangered this state of things, the people of these
States sought to destroy the nation itself rather than run the risk that . . . the
indirect influence of this association might overthrow the tyranny they had established. The principal danger that menaces us to-day is from the effort within the
States to deprive considerable numbers of persons of the civil and equal rights
which the General Government is endeavoring to secure to them.
Id at 335. Representative John Coburn, in discussing the Klan's purpose, painted a picture of total lawlessness in the South.
mhere is a preconcerted and effective plan by which thousands of men are
deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The arresting power is fettered, the
witnesses are silenced, the courts are impotent, the laws are annulled, the criminal
goes free, the persecuted citizen looks in vain for redress. This condition of affairs
extends to counties and States; it is, in many places, the rule, and not the
exception.
Id at 459; accord id at 443-49 (remarks of Rep. Butler); id at 320-21 (remarks of Rep.
Stoughton); id at 339 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id at 437 (remarks of Rep. Cobb).
35. Id app., at 107. Senator Pool quoted the Klan's oath to illustrate its purposes:
"That you will oppose all Radicals and negroes in all their political designs." Id
36. Senator Morton stated:
We are not at liberty to doubt that the purpose is by these innumerable and narneless crimes to drive those who are supporting the Republican party to abandon
their political faith or to flee from the State. A single murder of a leading Republican will temfy a whole neighborhood or county. The whipping of a dozen
negroes, because they are negroes and asserting their right to the equal enjoyment
of liberty, property, and the expression of their opinions, will have the effect to
temfy those who live for miles around.
Id. app., at 252. Thus, in Morton's view, the evil was not merely that the Klan engaged in
racially motivated or politically motivated violence against individuals, rather, Morton was
concerned that the impact of the terror spread far beyond the victims of the Klan. Compare id at 157 (remarks of Sen. Sherman) with id at 197 (remarks of Sen. Ames).
37. There were numerous examples of Klan violence directed at blacks. When speaking before Senate Select Committee, Representative Stoughton quoted the testimony of
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symbols of the federal

and republican^.^^ Addi-

Thomas W. Willeford, a former member of the North Carolina Klan, who stated that the
purpose of the Klan was to damage the Republican Party by burning, stealing, whipping
blacks, and murdering. Id at 320. Stoughton also quoted the testimony of Caswell Holt
who stated that he had been whipped and shot by the Klan because he had voted for the
Republican party. Holt testified that blacks in his vicinity did not feel safe and that many
had decided to leave. Id at 321. Stoughton recounted an incident which occurred in Mississippi wherein Klansmen attacked and shot at blacks who were attending a trial. Id at
322. As further evidence of the Klan's propensity for violence against blacks, Stoughton
relied on the testimony of James E. Boyd, who stated:
The most serious instance in my county. . .was the hanging of a negro man by
the name of Outlaw, who was taken from his house . . . about one o'clock at
night, by a band of from eighty to a hundred men, and hung upon an elm tree, not
very far from the courthouse door.
Id at 320. When Boyd was asked what offense Outlaw had committed, Boyd replied, "I
never heard of any." Id Boyd also testified that another black man, William Puryear, was
murdered because it was feared that he had witnessed the lynching of Outlaw. Id ;see also
id at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar).
Representative Butler recounted an incident wherein the Klan fired on a house occupied by blacks and severely injured a black resident. Id at 445. Another incident involved
the Klan forcing a black minister to flee his home in Missiiippi and subsequently burning
his home and church to the ground. Id Senator Morton suggested that one of the reasons
for the attacks on blacks was their former status. He stated that "colored people, because
of prejudices against their race, because they were formerly slaves and ha[d] been released
against the will of their masters" were subjected to Klan violence. Id app., at 251.
38. Representative Butler described the following incident:
1 . . .call the attention of the House to a publication of the American Missionary of October, 1870, of the taking from the hands of the officer of the law
and murder of Rev. W.C. Luke, a clergyman of the Methodist Episcopal church,
and a missionary . ..whose only offense was that he was teaching the blacks the
rudiments of an education under a commission from his bishop. Himself and four
of his pupils were taken from the hands of the sheriff, who had arrested them,
although they had done no wrong, and at midnight, by a band of thirty armed
ruffians, hanged to trees, his murderers even refusing to transmit a last letter written to his wife and little ones as he was preparing to yield up his spirit to Him
who gave it.
Id at 446.
39. Representative Butler stated that federal agents were whipped and shot at for
attempting to carry out their duties. Id at 445. Butler also read into the record the following letter regarding an incident that took place in St. Augustine, Florida, wherein purchasers of property from the federal government were ejected:
Hordes of ruthless, armed men. . .entered by force and took possession of property purchased by loyal citizens from the agents of the United States Government, and occupied by feeble, invalid ladies; and by these armed men these
ladies, with their furniture and their protectors, were forcibly thrust out of doors.
And the intruders now hold possession in fearless defiance of any law that now
exists. . . .
Id at 447. When the intruders were brought before a justice of the peace, he dismissed the
criminal complaint on the grounds that there was no law against entering a house. Id
40. According to Representative Butler, 2,000 Republicans were killed, wounded by
gunshot, or seriously injured by Klansmen or members of other similar organizations. Id
at 444. He quoted the following language from the report of the Senate committee which
investigated the Klan:
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tionally, the Klan sought to obstruct local government with its
tactics.41 At times, local officials acquiesced or conspired with
In this part, including that part of Orleans comprised in this district, and St.
Bernard, St. Helena, and Washington, the Republican party had a majority in
1868 of over one thousand, receiving 8,565 votes. Over three hundred leading
and active Republicans, white and colored, were killed, wounded or otherwise
cruelly maltreated by Ku Klux, and other instruments of violence and intimidation, within sixty days preceding the election.
Terror and dread took possession of the unprotected people, thousands of
colored Republicans and some whites voted the Democratic ticket from compulsion and fear, and the great mass remained away from the polls, and the eightyfive hundred and sixty-five Republican votes were reduced to eighty-four . . . .
Id Butler also read into the record the affidavit of Henderson Cash, a South Carolina
Republican, who had been threatened by the Klan:
Spartanburg, South Caroliia:
Personally appeared Henderson Cash before me, Enoch Cannon, notary public, and made oath that he was always loyal to the United States Government;
that he is now forced to denounce the Federal Republican party to save his life,
and that the Ku Klux had given him notice if he did not denounce Republicanism
that they would kill him; and that they had been to and broke into his house on
the night of the 25th of February; but that he (Cash) was in the forest . ..for the
safety of his life. Said Cash further says that there is a general reign of terror in
the community . ..and that loyal men are afraid to sleep at home in consequence
of the many brutal outrages inflicted upon loyal men for the support of the
Republican party.
Id. at 447. Based on the evidence available, Butler concluded that one of the purposes of
the Klan was to eliminate the Republican Party as a political force in the southern states.
The race of the Republican voter was insignificant, the aim of the Klan was to prevent
black and white voters from supporting the party of Reconstruction, and the same means
were employed to effectuate that end: terror and violence. See,ag.,id. at 391 (remarks of
Rep. Elliot) ("The white Republican of the South is also hunted down and murdered or
scourged for his opinion's sake, and during the past two years more than six hundred loyal
men of both races have perished in my State alone."); id at 460 (remarks of Rep. Coburn)
("Republicans are whipped, overawed, burned out, banished, or murdered because they
have political opinions . . . ."); id at 702 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id app., at 252
(remarks of Sen. Morton).
41. Representative Jeremiah M. Wilson contended that the Klan's purpose was to
overthrow state governments.
w h a t is the purpose of all this bloody work? I assert-and all well-authenticated evidence proves the truth of the assertion-that it is for the express purpose
of controlliig government in the States where these things are done, by preventing citizens from exercising their legitimate constitutional privileges. It is to overthrow by force and violence political opinion; it is to destroy by violence the
freedom of the ballot-box, and therefore it is the most dangerous form of domestic
violence and rebellion against the laws.
Id at 484. Perhaps the most glaring example of the Klan's efforts to render the state and
local governments null and void was the following notice from Union County, South Carolina, read into the record by Representative Butler:
(Special Orders No. 3, K.K.K.)
"Ignorance is the curse of God."
For this reason we are determined that members of the Legislature, the
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the
In addition to the racial and Republican targets of the
Klan, the Klan also victimized groups of individuals that held
political views in conflict with Klan values. Representative
Maynard stated his belief that the violence of the Klan, in addition to being directed at blacks, was also visited upon "the native
Unionist, the native loyal man . . . held up to odium as the
enemy of his region, as the enemy of his people, who has sold
himself to the enemies of his country."43 Maynard was particularly concerned about the safety of those who held views that
were unpopular in the region.44 In his opinion, 5 1985(3) was
school commissioner, and the county commissioners of Union, shall no longer
officiate.
Fifteen days' notice from this date is therefore given, and if they, one and all,
do not at once and forever resign their present inhuman, disgraceful, and outrageous rule, then retributive justice will as surely be used as night follows day.
Id at 448. After this notice was posted, the Klan notilied the Governor of South Carolina
that all state officials were to resign. The Governor appealed to the President to aid him in
putting down this rebellion against the state government. Id Butler contended that the
Klan orchestrated the impeachment of the governor of North Carolina because he used
military forces to stop Klan violence. Id at 443. Other incidents in the record involved the
murder of a state senator in the jury room of a courthouse on the day when a Democratic
Party convention was in session; the arrest of the mayor of Meridian, Mississippi, by the
Klan, who then ordered him to leave town; and the murder of a judge and eight to ten
blacks after a riot in a courtroom. Id at 443, 445.
In addition to attacks on the executive and judicial branches of government, the Klan
also sought to intimidate law enforcement officers. In one case, a local sheriff was murdered because he had arrested a Klan member. Id at 444. In other cases, local law
enforcement authorities were implicated in Klan violence. Representative Butler recounted
an incident in Tennessee wherein a group of Klansmen fired into the home of two black
men who returned their fire. After the Klan had been repelled, the occupants of the house
discovered that the local constable and deputy sheriff were among the dead Klansmen. Id
at 445. The view of the Klan as an organization that sought to overthrow state and local
authority is supported by historians of this period. See generally DAVID M. CHALMERS,
HOODEDAMERICANISM
(1965); FRANKLIN,
supra note 21.
42. Representative Aaron F. Perry eloquently addressed this problem.
Where these gangs of assassins show themselves the rest of the people look on, if
not with sympathy, at least with forbearance. ...Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see
not; judges, having ears to hear, hear noe witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it;
grand and petit juries act as ifthey might be accomplices. In the presence of these
gangs all the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the processes of
justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and feared detection.
Among the most dangerous things an injured party can do is to appeal to justice.
Of the uncounted scores and hundreds of atrocious mutilations and murders it is
credibly stated that not one has been punished.
CONG.GLOBE, supra note 22, app., at 78. See, ag., id at 368 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon);
id. at 107 (remarks of Sen. Pool).
43. Id app., at 309.
44. In this regard, he stated:
m h e unpopular man, the man who entertains odious sentiments, the man whose
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designed to protect all classes of persons who were subjected to
attack for their political views or racial
Representative Maynard's views regarding the classes to be
protected under 5 1985(3) were shared by members of the Senate. Senator Morton argued that the statute was designed to
protect the rights of any class of citizens. He stated:
If there be organizations in any of the States having for their
purpose to deny to any class or condition of men equal protection, to deny to them the equal enjoyment of rights that are
secured by the Constitution of the United States, it is the right
and duty of Congress to make such organizations and combinations an offense against the United States.&

Senator Edmunds also believed that the 5 1985(3) was not limited to cases involving racially discriminatory animus. He
stated:
We do not undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be
called a private conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud
of one man or set of men against another to prevent one getting
an indictment in the State courts against men for burning down
his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that his
conspiracy was formed against this man because he was a
Democrat, . . . or because he was a Catholic, . . or because he
was a Vermonter, . . . then this section could reach it.47

.

Thus in both the Senate and the House concerns were
expressed about the deprivation of rights by the Klan based on a
variety of identifiers, such as race, political views, religion, or
religion ... is at variance with the common belief, the man whose political views
do not accord with the generally received opinions of the community in which he
resides, finds his personal security very often in peril from the ebullitions of passion and the gusts of anger which agitate his immediate neighbors, and which are
not regulated or iduenced by the wider and broader opinions that obtain elsewhere in the land and among the whole people.
Id. app., at 311.
45. He stated:
Under this section I hold that if a body of men conspire to drive out all the
northern men, all the "Yankees," all the "carpet-baggers" from the community,
their offense comes within the condemnation of this provision. If they combine to
prevent the colored men from voting, the case is the same. If they combine to
prevent men from voting the Republican ticket, the provision meets that case.
Id. app., at 310; see also id at 320-21 (remarks of Rep. Stoughton); id. at 339 (remarks of
Rep. Kelley); id app., at 262 (remarks of Rep. Dunnell); id app., at 277 (remarks of Rep.
Porter); id. at 394 (remarks of Rep. Rainey); id at 459 (remarks of Rep. Coburn); id. app.,
at 185 (remarks of Rep. Platt); id app., at 300 (remarks of Rep. Stevenson).
46. Id app., at 251.
47. Id at 567; see also id at 568 (remarks of Sen. Edrnunds); id. at 606 (remarks of
Sen. Pool); id at 686 (remarks of Sen. Schurz) .
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regional origins. In the minds of those who supported the statute, it was designed to remedy the denial of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution to all classes of citizens targeted by
the Klan or other organizations. No supporter indicated any
intention to limit the application of the statute to conspiracies
motivated by racial animus.
The incidents discussed by the supporters of the statute
confirm that the Klan was an organization prone to violence and
was comprised of private individuals and local law enforcement
officers, many of whom were former Confederate soldiers and
members of either the Democratic or Conservative Parties.
They engaged in violence and acts of intimidation against groups
or individuals in an effort to reverse the gains of the Reconstruction era. Essentially, the Klan viewed with hostility blacks and
others who either aided blacks or had come to the South after
the Civil War. In addition to the use of brutal tactics against
individuals, the Klan also sought to render local governments
ineffective, including judicial officers, law enforcement agents,
and other elected officials. Its goal was to replace the organs of
elected government with Klan rule. Many of these local governments were at that time controlled by blacks and Republicans.
Faced with this breakdown of law and order, and the
refusal, reluctance, or inability of state and local governments to
provide redress for Klan victims, Grant sent the aforementioned
~ ~response, Congress adopted the Ku
message to C o n g r e ~ s .In
Klux Klan Act of 1871. The Act's provisions provided remedies
for the various types of problems caused by the
Congress sought to provide a federal venue and cause of action to
address the complete breakdown of law and order in the South.
The question of which constitutional rights Congress sought to
protect when it enacted 8 1985(3) remains unanswered.

B. The Rights To Be Protected
During the debates on 8 1985(3), Congress was confronted
with facts showing a complete breakdown of law and order in
48. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
49. Section one ($ 1983) of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 provided a federal remedy
where persons, acting under color of law, deprived others of their constitutional rights. See
supra note 22. Section two ($ 1985(3)) was designed to punish, criminally and civilly, conspiracies to deprive others of their constitutional rights. The thud section gave the President the power to intervene militarily to suppress violence when state officials requested
such help: Section four provided that martial law could be declared by the President when
state authorities conspired with Klan or similar organizations.
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the former Confederate states. Secret, paramilitary, terrorist
organizations threatened and intimidated local law enforcement
and other government officials from performing their duties.
Blacks, their supporters, Republicans, and others sympathetic to
the Union were intimidated, brutalized, and murdered because
of their political persuasion or opinions, or, in the case of exslaves, because of their former status. In the face of this
onslaught, the state and local governments stood powerless to
provide shelter from the ever-increasing storm. In short, the
Klan had replaced the traditional arbiters of government with a
reign of terror. Many members of Congress believed that the
states were either unable or unwilling to provide protection
against the Klan. Thus, they sought to establish a federal forum
for the preservation of constitutional rights in 1985(3).
By its terms, 1985(3) provided a federal remedy when two
or more persons entered into a conspiracy to deprive others of
equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities
under the laws. The language employed by Congress raises two
questions. One, what rights did Congress seek to protect when it
enacted the statute? Two, was the statute aimed at deprivations
of those rights by private or state actors? A review of the positions of the legislators reveals that Congress sought to protect
rights which flowed from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. With respect to the equal protection
clause of § 1985(3), many of the speakers shared the view that,
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the states were under an
affirmative duty to ensure that equal protection of the laws was
afforded to persons within their borders, and that the failure to
protect the targeted groups of persons from the Klan was a
denial of equal protection. With respect to the privileges and
immunities clause of § 1985(3), many of the speakers asserted
that the statute was designed to provide a federal remedy for the
deprivation of any privilege or immunity that the citizen had
under the Constitution. Thus, that clause as used in 1985(3)
was not limited to deprivations of purely Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Commenting on the constitutional amendments that
allowed Congress to enact § 1985(3), Representative Perry made
it clear that he believed the conditions in the South demonstrated that rights secured by the three post-Civil War amend-
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ments were in jeopardy.5o Similarly, Representative Garfield,
speaking in support of the bill, asserted that the adoption of
those three amendments brought about a fundamental shift in
power between the states and the national govern~nent.~~
He
contended that, before the war, the protection of life and property of private citizens was purely within the province of the
state. The enactment of these three amendments, however,
enlarged Congress's power to legislate to ensure that rights
secured by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were not denied or abridged.52 Garfield believed that
Congress had the power to provide for the punishment of both
private and state actors who deprived others of the rights
secured by these amendment^.^^
Although some members believed that Congress had the
power to enact the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 under all three
post-Civil War amendments, the majority of the debates focused
on whether Congress had the power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to punish private persons when the state failed to
protect its residents from Klan violence.54 One theory advanced
50. Representative Perry stated:
The privileges and immunities secured to a large class of citizens by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth articles of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States are abridged. They are deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. Their right to vote is abridged or denied on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and the equal protection of the law
is denied them.
ONG.
GLOBE,supra note 22, app., at 78. Representative Maynard asserted that under
5 1985(3) Congress was protecting, inter alia, Fifteenth Amendment rights. Id. app., at
310.
51. Id app., at 149-50.
52. Id;see also id. app., at 83 (remarks of Rep. Bingham) ("The powers of the States
have been l i i t e d and the powers of Congress extended by the . . . [t]hirteen[th], fourteen[th], and fifteenith] [amendments]."); id. at 693-96 (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). Further support for this view can be found in the title of the Act, to wit: "An Act to Enforce
the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
For Other Purposes." Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
53. CONG. GLOBE,supra note 22, app., at 153 ("[Congress had the] power . . . to
provide by law for the punishment of all persons, official or private, who shall invade these
rights, and who by violence, threats, or intimidation shall deprive any citizen of their fullest
enjoyment.").
54. The debates concerning the power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment
are significant in that many of the members of Congress in 1871 were also members in 1866
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The following Senators voted in favor of
the Fourteenth Amendment and were supporters of the Ku Klux Klan Act: Anthony,
Conkling, Edmunds, Ferry, Morrill of Vermont, Pomeroy, Cragin, Nye, Ramsey, Sherman, Stewart, and Wilson. Id at 709. The following members of the House were involved
in the enactment of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ku Klux Klan Act: Bingham, Kelley, Cook, Dawes, Garfield, Mercur, Myers, Scofield, and Shellabarger. Id. at
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by the supporters of the Act was that the states were under an
affirmative duty to provide for the equal protection of the laws to
all persons within their borders. These legislators believed that
the southern states, by failing to punish or convict Klan members of any crimes, either actively encouraged the violence or
tacitly acquiesced in it. This failure to prosecute was viewed as a
denial of equal protection of the laws since it was only the victims of Klan violence who were not protected by law-enforcement authorities. In the view of the proponents of the
affirmative duty to provide equal protection, when the state,
through malfeasance or nonfeasance, failed to afford classes of
persons such protection, then the Congress was empowered to
act in its stead to prevent the deprivation of rights secured by the
Equal Protection Clause.ss The legislators who adhered to this
view seemed to assume that there was a conspiracy, or perhaps a
tacit agreement, between the state or local officials and the Klan.
The former had abdicated their responsibility to enforce the law,
while the latter carried out the purpose of the gentlemen's
understanding-the
effective denial of all rights recently
522. Representative Bingham has been credited as the drafter of the original equal protection language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id app., at 86.
55. Representative Coburn supported this view of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The failure to afford protection equally to all is a denial of it.
Afiirmative action or legislation is not the only method of a denid of protection by a State . . . . A State may by positive enactment cut off from some the
right to vote, to testify or to ask for redress of wrongs in court. ... This positive
denial of protection is no more flagrant or odious or dangerous than to allow
certain persons to be outraged as to their property, safety, liberty, or life; than to
overlook offenders in such cases; than to utterly disregard the sufferer and his
persecutor, and treat the one as a nonentity and the other as a good citizen. .. . A
systematic failure to make arrests, to put on trial, to convict, or to punish offenders against the rights of a great class of citizens is a denial of equal protection .. .
and
justifies . . . the active interference of the only power that can give it. . . .
.
It may be safely said, then, that there is a denial of the equal protection of the
law by many of these States. It is therefore the plain duty of Congress to enforce
by appropriate legislation the rights secured by this clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution.
Id at 459. See, e.g., id. at 334 (remarks of Rep. Hoar) (where state does not protect a
particular class of its citizens from violence, state denies equal protection); id. at 428
(remarks of Rep. Beatty) (The state denied equal protection by failing to "bring the guilty
to punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and innocent."); id app., at
79 (remarks of Rep. Perry) (Equal Protection Clause commands that "no State shall fail to
afford or withhold the equal protection of the laws."); id app., at 182 (remarks of Rep.
Mercur) ("mhe word 'deny' .. . means to refuse, or to persistently neglect or omit to give
that 'equal protection' imposed upon the State by the Constitution."); id at 506 (remarks
of Sen. Pratt); id. app., at 251-52 (remarks of Sen. Morton); id at 608 (remarks of Sen.
Pool); id. at 409 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen).
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acquired by the freed black, the rights of those who supported
them, and the rights of other groups who espoused political
views inimical to the Klan.56
While there were numerous legislators who supported the
view that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed an affirmative duty on the states to protect
equally all persons in their life, liberty, and property, there was a
sharp divergence of views regarding whether Congress had the
power under that Amendment. to punish private actors. Two
views emerged. The radical view was that where the state
refused to do anything to protect persons within its borders, the
federal government had the power to replace the state, in one
sense providing the protection that the state neglected to furnish, and punish private act01-s.'~ Under this theory, even where
state law provided for the punishment of crimes committed by
Klansmen, if the state failed to prosecute and thereby tacitly per56. Representative George E Hoar illustrated this conspiracy theory by alluding to
the conditions in South Carolina, which was three-fifths black.
[S]uppose that in that State, with its constitution providing trial by jury, providing an independent judiciary, providing for equality of civil rights, providing the
right to vote and to hold office of every citizen, there should be a conspiracy upon
the part of a certain portion of the people that by intimidation, by murder, by
outrage, this majority of the people dare not exercise those rights which their
State constitution undertakes to declare for them. Suppose that by that conspiracy, secret but understood ...every person who dared to lift his voice in opposition to the sentiment of this conspiracy found his life and property insecure.
Suppose that conspiracy takes possession of the jury-box, and under its rule no
one of the majority of that State can gain his case on whatever evidence . . . .
Suppose . . that the constitution of the State all the time declaring that there
shall be punishment of crime, to a particular class of citizens there is no criminal
remedy enforced for any crime committed upon them.
Id at 333. The state of affairs Hoar hypothesized was in fact the reality of life for blacks
and others groups with unpopular political views in the South. The evidence before Congress established that a group of private citizens, acting in concert, through terror and
violence prevented blacks and Republicans from casting votes for the party of their choice,
that their lives were unprotectedby law enforcement authorities, and that no Klansman
had been convicted of any crimes in any of the states.
57. Representative David P. Lowe supported this view of Congress's authority.
The argument leads to the deduction that while the first section of the [fourteenth] amendment prohibits all deprivations of rights by means of State laws, yet
all rights may be subverted and denied, without color of law, and the Federal
Government have no power to interfere. All you have to do . . . to drive every
obnoxious man from a State, or slay h i with impunity, is to have the law all
right on the statute-book, but quietly permit rapine and violence to take their
way, without the hinderance of local authorities. ... The rights and privileges of
citizens are not only not to be denied by a State but they are not to be deprived of
them.
Id. at 375.

.
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mitted such violence to take place, Congress could step in and
punish the private individuals without any allegation that they
induced a state official not to perform his duty under the Federal
Constitution to afford equal protecti~n.'~
The conservative view was that if the state's officials refused
to afford equal protection, Congress could punish the official for
such a refusal, but Congress could only sanction private actors
or conspirators when they prevented the state officer from performing his federal constitutional obligation of providing equal
protection. In order for the private persons' conduct to be
actionable, they must have induced the state officer, by violence
or threats, to neglect his duty to provide protection. Under this
theory, Congress had the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to punish private persons only when they interfered with a
state officer's duty to protect equally the life, liberty, and property of those residing within the state.5g In the revised draft of
section two of the Act, both views of the Fourteenth Amendment were included.60
58. See, eg.,id at 368 (remarks of Rep. Sheldon) ("Shall it be said that the citizen
may be wrongfully deprived of his life, liberty, and property . . . and the national arm
cannot be extended to him because there is a State government whose duty is to afford him
redress, but refuses or neglects to discharge that duty?"); id at 334-35 (remarks of Rep.
Hoar); id at 501 (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen); id app., at 68-71 (remarks of Rep.
Shellabarger) (Act was designed to remedy denial of equal protection by providing federal
intervention against individuals); id app., at 251 (remarks of Sen. Morton).
59. Representative Horatio C. Burchard contended that the federal govemment
could punish "the [state] officer who violates his official constitutional duty" to provide
equal protection, and Congress had the power to "punish the illegal attempts of private
individuals [who sought] to prevent the performance of official duties in the manner
required by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id app., at 314. Representative Luke P. Poland shared this view of Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment:
I cannot agree .. . that if the State authorities fail to punish crime committed in
the State therefore the United States may step in and by a law of Congress provide for punishing that offense . . . .
When the State has provided the law, and has provided the officer to carry
out the law, then we have the right to say that anybody who undertakes to interfere and prevent the execution of that State law is amenable to this provision of
the Constitution, and to the law that we may make under it declaring it to be an
offense against the United States.
Id. at 514; accord id. at 486 (remarks of Rep. Cook); id. at 579 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).
60. The revised draft of section two provided:
That if two or more persons . . . shall conspire together for the purpose . . . of
depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws. . .or
for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State
from giving or securing to all persons within such State the equal protection of
the laws . . . each and every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high
crime.
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While there was some disagreement in Congress regarding
its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to legislate against
private individuals for deprivations of the Equal Protection
Clause, it appears to have been the consensus that when Congress used the terms "privileges and immunities" in § 1985(3), it
intended to protect all privileges and immunities that a citizen
had under any provision of the Constitution. Among the privileges and immunities that Congress sought to protect was the
right to vote as secured by the Fifteenth Amendment and freedom of speech.61 Other speakers expressed the view that the
privileges and immunities protected under 5 1985(3) were those
that all citizens of free governments enjoyed.62 Senator Morton
Id at 477. The first clause of the revised draft seeks to punish a conspiracy to deny equal
protection without reference to any interference with state officers. The second clause
addresses that issue. Thus, it would appear that both theories of the Fourteenth Amendment were incorporated into the revised bi. For a thorough discussion of the different
views of the speakers regarding Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment to
punish individuals, see generally Alfred Avins, The Ku KIux Klan Act of 1871: Some
Rejected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST.LOUISU. L.J. 331
(1967); Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
Against Private Acts, 73 YALEL.J. 1353 (1964).
61. In discussing what was meant by the term "privileges and immunities" as used in
5 1985(3), Representative Maynard stated:
I suppose it embraces all privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution;
for example, those guarantied by the constitutional provision ... securing to citizens of each State "all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."
It would include also the right of voting secured by the fifteenth amendment; it
would include any of the personal rights which the Constitution guarantees to the
citizen.
CONG. GLOBE,supra note 22, app., at 310.
62. Representative Hoar addressed himself to the meaning of the term "privileges and
immunities" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment and the Act: " m h a t is comprehended in this term, 'privileges and immunities?' Most clearly it comprehends all the privileges and immunities declared to belong to the citizen by the Constitution itself. . . . m t
comprehends those privileges and immunities which [are] ...fundamental and essential to
citizenship." Id at 334. In support of his thesis, Hoar relied on the opinion of Judge
Washington in Corfield v. Corye11,6 F. Cas.546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), wherein
the court was called upon to interpret the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
found in Article IV of the Constitution.
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments.
Id at 551. The court went on to hold that included among the privileges and immunities
of Article IV were, inter alia, the enjoyment of life and liberty, the right to acquire property, and the right of interstate travel. Id at 551-52. According to Hoar, § 1985(3) was
intended to protect all of these rights against deprivation by a conspiracy of persons.
CONG. GLOBE,supra note 22, at 334; accord id. at 69 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger, relying on Corfield) ("Congress [has the] power to legislate directly for enforcement of such
rights as are fundamental elements of citizenship."); id. at 475 (remarks of Rep. Dawes)
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expressed the view that among the privileges and immunities
protected was the right to interstate
The opposition
argued that under the Fourteenth Amendment, only those rights
that were acquired by virtue of United States citizenship could
be protected under that Amendment and, by seeking in
5 1985(3) to protect all fundamental privileges and immunities
that were secured by any clause of the Constitution, Congress
was exceeding its Fourteenth Amendment powers.64 Thus, both
the sponsors and opponents agreed that the phrase "privileges
and immunities" as used in 5 1985(3) was intended to reach and
protect rights found not only in the Fourteenth Amendment but
elsewhere in the Constitution.
When it enacted the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Congress
was faced with a guerilla rebellion in the former Confederate
states. Whereas during the war the soldiers of the South wore
grey uniforms, they now donned white sheets and hoods. Nevertheless, their purpose was the same-to challenge federal sovereignty. During the Civil War, the southern military
establishment declared that the federal goveniment had no
authority over the southern states and seceded from the Union.
After the war, the remnants of the southern military established
an organization to carry on the mission of the former Confederacy-to deny the former slaves, their supporters, and union sympathizers all their constitutional rights.
In the face of massive evidence of the breakdown of law and
order in the southern states, Congress designed a bill that it
("The rights, privileges, and immunities of the American citizen, secured to hi under the
Constitution of the United States, are the subject-matter of this bid.");id app., at 188-89
(remarks of Rep. Willard). For a thorough discussion of this issue, see generally Neil H.
Cogan, Section 1985(3)3 Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on Texa History, Progress,
and Cynicism, 39 RUTGERSL. REV. 515 (1987).
63. Senator Morton said:
When the war ended many men who had been in the Union Army remained in
the South, intending to make it their home and identify themselves with its fortunes. Others emigrated from the North, taking with them large capital . . . .
This was th& right . . . but they were denounced as adventurers and intruders,
and the odious slang of "carpet-baggers" was reechoed by the Democracy of the
North, who sent word to the South that these men had no rights they were bound
to respect.
Emigration is a part of the genius'of the American people. ... To emigrate
from'state to State, and there to enjoy all the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the U n i t 9 States, is guarantied by the Constitution . . . .
CONG.GLOBE,
supra note 22, app., at 253.
64. Id app., at 47-48 (remarks of Rep. Kerr); id. app., at 216 (remarks of Sen.
Thuman).
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hoped would provide federal remedies for the deprivations of
constitutional rights. During the debates, the proponents of the
Ku Klux Klan Act expressed grave concerns about the safety
and security of blacks, Republicans, northerners who moved
south after the war, and native-born southerners who were loyal
to the national government. Clearly, these groups were intended
to come within the coverage of the statute since they had been
targeted by the Klan. There is ample evidence, however, that
Congress did not intend to limit the protection of the statute to
only the groups that it identified in the debates. Congress sought
to provide a remedy for any group that was singled out by an
organization or individuals acting in a conspiracy to deprive that
group of rights secured by the Constitution. The key factor was
not the composition of the group; rather, it was the motivation
of the conspirators. If the actions of the conspirators, motivated
not out of a personal vendetta against another individual, but
against a group as a whole, had the purpose or the effect of denying constitutional rights, then such a conspiracy would come
within the purview of $ 1985(3). There is no support for the
theory that the statute was designed solely to protect blacks.
In summary, throughout the debates, the rights that were to
be protected under $ 1985(3) were foremost in the minds of the
sponsors. Congress sought to protect all rights held by citizens
under the Constitution. While the sponsors referred to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as potential
sources of Congress's power, no legislator sought to limit the
reach of the Act to only those amendments. With respect to the
equal protection clause of $ 1985(3), clearly Congress sought to
vindicate Fourteenth Amendment rights. Under the privileges
and immunities clause of the statute, however, Congress sought
to vindicate any right that a citizen had under any provision of
the Constitution. As to the issue of whether the Act was
designed to reach private or state actors, there is no indication in
the legislative history that Congress intended $ 1985(3) to be
limited solely to cases involving government official^.^^ Thus,
65. The view that 5 1985(3) was intended to reach private persons is buttressed when
the statute is compared with 5 1983, which was originally section one of the Act. Whereas
5 1983 explicitly contains a requirement that the person causing the constitutional deprivation acted "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory," 5 1985(3) contains no such provision. Thus, the debates regarding whether
Congress had the authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to punish individuals, the
language used in 3 1985(3), and the other provisions of the larger Act, point to the conclusion that 5 1985(3) was intended to reach private actors. Additionally, the majority of the
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when Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, it intended the
statute to serve as a protector of the constitutional rights of all
citizens against deprivations at the hands of private individuals.
Despite that noble intention, the statute has never been accorded
the scope that Congress intended.

Since its enactment in 1871, 1985(3) has been of little utility because of a long string of cases incorrectly decided by the
United States Supreme Court. From the nineteenth century to
the present, the Court has been unwilling to allow the statute to
serve the noble ends for which it was enacted-to provide a federal remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights. The
Court has limited the scope of the statute by imposing a state
a class-based animus prereq~isite,~~
and by
action req~irement,~~
circumscribing the classes of individuals that could rely on
$j1985(3) as a federal remedy.68 In the October 1991 Term, the
Court will have the opportunity to consider whether women or
women seeking an abortion constitute an appropriate class under
1985(3).69 The Court may also address the issue of which
rights are protected under the statute. In this section, the cases
interpreting § 1985(3) and the possible outcome of the Bray case
will be discussed in light of the legislative history of the statute.
United States v. Harris
Until 1951, § 1985(3) lay dormant, in large part due to the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. HarrisY7Owherein
the criminal counterpart to § 1985(3) was declared unconstitutional.'l Harris involved an indictment under 5519 of twenty

A.

examples cited by the proponents of the statute involved deprivations at the hands of private individuals and not state actors. See GriiEn v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 98-99
(1971).
66.
67.
68.
69.

Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 655 (1951).
Gn%n, 403 U.S. at 102.
United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837-39 (1983).
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. granted sub nom Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
70. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
71. Id at 641. When the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was enacted, section two had a

criminal and civil component. Both remedies sought to punish deprivations of constitutional rights under the same set of circumstances, ie., conspiracies aimed at depriving any
person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. Id. at 632. When the United States Statutes were revised in 1874, the
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men who removed four prisoners from jail and beat them.72 The
Court considered the constitutionality of 5 5519 under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendment^.^^
With respect to the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court
acknowledged that Congress was empowered thereunder "to
protect all persons within . . . the United States from being . . .
subjected to slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime."74 The Court also recognized that Congress had
the power to enact legislation securing the equality guaranteed
by the Thirteenth Amendment.75 The Court, however, viewed
5 5519 as exceeding the scope of Congress's power under that
Amendment. The fatal flaw in 5 5519 was that its reach was not
solely limited to deprivations by whites of rights secured by the
Thirteenth Amendment for the former slaves.76 Thus, unlike the
Grz3n Court, the Harris Court saw no class-based animus
requirement in the criminal counterpart to 5 1985(3). In fact,
the Court concluded that under its terms, whites could be protected as well as
Additionally, the Court in Harris had little trouble declaring that 5 5519 exceeded Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment because that Amendment was directed at
state action and private persons were subject to the provisions of
5 5519.78 Similarly, the Court declared that the Fifteenth
criminal provisions were codified as 3 5519 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74 and the civil
counterpart was codified as 3 1980 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74. The civil provision
was designated as 3 1985(3) in the 1979 United States Code.
72. Harris, 106 U.S. at 630-31.
73. Id at 636-37.
74. Id at 640.
75. Id
76. The Court stated:

Under that section it would be an offence for two or more white persons to conspire . . .for the purpose of depriving another white person of the equal protection
of the laws. It would be an offence for two or more colored persons, enfranchised
slaves, to conspire with the same purpose against a white citizen or against
another colored citizen who had never been a slave.
Id at 641.
77. Id
78. According to the Court,3 5519 was not limited
to take effect only in case the State shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States, or deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the
laws. It applies, no matter how well the State may have performed its duty.
Under it private persons are liable to punishment for conspiring to deprive any
one of the equal protection of the laws enacted by the State.
Id. at 639.
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Amendment could not provide Congress with a source of power
to enact the statute since that Amendment related to the right to
vote, and 5 5519 was "framed to protect from invasion by private persons, the equal privileges and immunities under the laws,
of all persons and classes of persons.'y79Having determined that
the statute was not authorized under these amendments, the
Court declared 8 5519 unconstit~tional.~~
The Harris Court partially recognized the purpose of section twos1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, but it did not adequately
consider the legislative history of the Act in order to determine
which rights Congress sought to protect. The Court was correct
when it ruled that section two was intended to reach private
action. The legislative history is replete with incidents of private
marauders, not directly aided by the state, terrorizing certain
segments of the southern population. The Court also correctly
determined that the statute was designed to protect all classes of
persons.
With respect to the constitutionality of the statute, the
Court misread the legislative history concerning which rights
Congress sought to protect. The sponsors of the bill sought to
protect all persons from deprivations of any rights secured by
the Constitution. When discussing the privileges and immunities clause of section two, the legislators made it clear that they
did not intend to limit that clause solely to Fourteenth Amendment rights.82 They declared that whatever privileges and
immunities a citizen had, those were to be protected by section
Thus, under a broad reading of the statute, privileges and
immunities flowing from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments or from any constitutional source could be
protected under section two. Additionally, where there is interference with a state official's duty to provide equal protection,
which appears to have been the case in Harris, Congress would
arguably have the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to
enact a statute to remedy such conduct.84 In fact, by its terms,
section two created a claim where the conspirators prevented or
79. Id. at 637.
80. Id at 644.
81. For purposes of clarity, in this section both 5 1985(3) and 5 5519 will be discussed as section two of the Act.
82. See supra notes 50-53, 61-64 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
84. The Court, in Collins, suggested that where private individuals seek to manipulate state officials or to impede them in the performance of their duties, a conspiracy to
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hindered a state officer from securing the equal protection of the
law to all persons.85 Nevertheless, the Harris Court ignored the
legislative history regarding the rights to be protected and narrowly interpreted the Constitution to declare the criminal c o n terpart to § 1985(3) unconstitutional.

B.

Collins v. Hardyman
After the decision in Harris, § 1985(3) was not invoked
it was alleged that a group
until 1951. In Collins v. HardymanYs6
of individuals, opposed to the political views and opinions of a
California political club, conspired for the purpose of preventing
the club from holding a meeting to discuss and adopt a resolution opposed to the Marshall Plan.87 The conspirators went to
the meeting, assaulted the members of the club, and used other
violent means to break up the meeting. The plaintiffs contended
that their rights to assemble peaceably and petition the federal
government for redreis of grievances were violated by the cons p i r a t o r ~ .Thus,
~ ~ they sued under § 1985(3).89
Although the plaintiffs alleged no Fourteenth Amendment
violations, in a 6-3 decision, the Court considered the statute as
an enactment pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
powers. The Court noted that
[slince the decision . . . in the Civil Rights Cases, the principle
has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the
action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may f&ly be said to be that of the
States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.g0
In the Court's view, the Fourteenth Amendment protected individuals from state action and not against wrongs by other individuals. After concluding that only state action could run afoul
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and considering the statute in
question as solely an exercise of Congress's powers under that
Amendment, the Court, constrained by its own limited analysis
of the source of Congress's power to enact 5 1985(3), held that
deprive another person of equal protection of the laws would fall within the ambit of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1951).
85. See supra notes 8, 22.
86. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
87. Id at 653.
88. Id. at 654-55.
89. Id. at 653-54.
90. Id. at 658 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)) (citation omitted).
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state officials must be involved in a conspiracy to deprive
another person of the constitutional rights protected by the stat~ t e . ~Private
l
persons acting without state cooperation or participation could not violate the statute.92 The dissent took issue
with the majority's limited view of the power of Congress to
enact a statute that proscribed private conduct violative of constitutional rights. Justice Burton, joined by Justices Black and
Douglas, believed that Congress had the power, separate and
apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, to protect constitutional rights from deprivations by private persons.93 The dissent
contended that this is what Congress had done when it enacted
§ 1985(3).94
While the majority viewed 5 1985(3) as solely an exercise of
Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the dissent, consistent with the legislative history of the statute, viewed
it as protecting a far broader category of rights than those delineated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Whereas rights flowing
from that Amendment can only be violated by state conduct, the
dissent alluded to another set of rights that could be invaded by
private persons. Among those rights was the right to petition
peaceably the federal government for redress of grie~ances.~'
Id at 655.
Id at 655, 658-59,661.
Id at 664 (Burton, J., Black, J., Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id at 663-64.
Id at 663. Other constitutional rights that are protected from invasion by private
individuals are the federal right to free access to the seat of government, Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,43-44(1867);the right peaceably to assemble to petition the
government, United States v. Cruikshank, 92U.S. 542,552(1875)('The right of the people
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances
...in an attribute of national citizenship. ..."); Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16Wall.)
36,79 (1872); the right of protection from attack while in the custody of a federal marshall,
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 285 (1892), the right to inform federal officers of
violations of federal law, In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532,535-36(1895); the right to interstate
travel, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,757-60(1966);Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
at 79-80;CrandaN, 73 U.S.(6 Wall.) at 44,48-49.
Congress's power to protect persons against deprivations by private individuals of the
rights of national citizenship is implied from the Constitution and is not derived from any
particular provision. See, cg., Daniel P. Sheehan & Robert D. Rapp, The Scope and Application of 42 USC § 1985(3): Beyond the Fourteenth Amendment Question, 2 A N n o c ~
L.J. 131, 145-47(1982); Marilyn R. Walter, Zhe Ku Klux Klan Act and the State Action
L.Q. 3, 50-52(1985).
Requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 58 TEMP.
It is well established that Congress has the power to legislate for the protection of
these fundamental rights against private interference. See, eg., Guest, 383 U.S. at 759 n.17
("[Tlhe constitutional right of interstate travel is a right secured against interference from
any source whatever, whether governmental or private."); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347,362-64(1915);In re Quarles, 158 U.S. at 536-37;Logan v. United States, 144U.S. 263,

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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The majority ignored this point and limited the scope of the statute to Fourteenth Amendment deprivations, thereby emasculating § 1985(3) by removing from its penumbra private conduct
violating constitutional rights. Although the allegations in Harris clearly came within the category of constitutional rights that
Congress has the power to protect against the invasion of private
actors, the Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim
under 8 1985(3).

C Griffin v. Breckenridge
The Court revisited 8 1985(3) in 1971, one hundred years
after the statute's enactment. G n s n v. Breckenridge 96 involved
a racial incident in Mississippi reminiscent of the type of conduct that formed part of the motivation for the passage of the
law originally.97.The plaintiffs alleged that the white defendants
had entered a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving them of
certain rights secured by the Constituti~n.~~
Those rights
included the right to freedom of speech, movement, and assembly, the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, the right to be secure in their persons and their homes,
and the right not to be enslaved. It was alleged that the conspirators had injured the plaintiffs and deprived them of the aforementioned rights in violation of § 1985(3).99 On the basis of
Collins, the court of appeals ailinned the district court's dismissal of the complaint.loO
284 (1892); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 79 (1884); Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651, 665 (1884); see also Howard M . Feuerstein, Civil Rights Crimes and the Federal
Power to Punkh Private Individuals for Interference with Federally Secured Rights, 19
VAND. L. REV. 641, 651-65 (1966).
96. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
97. The facts in Gn3n were remarkably similar to the Klan's activities in the nineteenth century. The plaintiffs, black citizens of Mississippi, allleged that they were travelling in a vehicle on federal, state, and local highways, when a group of whites attacked
them in the mistaken belief that the black passengers were civil rights workers. Id at 8992.
98. Id
99. Id at 92.
100. Gri5n v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817, 826 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 88
(1971). The court of appeals questioned the soundness of Collins but noted that it was
required to follow the Collins Court's holding that only conspiracies under color of law
could be reached under 5 1985(3). Id The court also considered plaintiffs' non-Fourteenth Amendment claims, such as the right to interstate travel, as potentially viable, since
those claims did not require state action. The court was constrained, however, by the holding in Collins that Congress did not intend for the statute to reach those claims. Id. at 82223.
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With respect to the constitutional issue, the Supreme Court
avoided explicitly overruling Collins by noting that in that case
the Court had not based its decision on constitutional grounds,
but upon a construction of the statute itself.lo1 The Court did
note that the Collins majority had observed that if the complaint
alleging a private conspiracy was construed as meeting the
requirements of the statute, serious constitutional issues would
have been raised. Nevertheless, the GnBn Court held that
many of the constitutional problems noted in Collins no longer
existed because of the evolution of decisional law since that case
was decided.lo2
Freed from the constraints of Collins, the Court, turned its
attention to identifying a source for Congress's power to enact a
statute banning private conspiracies that violated constitutional
rights. The Thirteenth Amendment, the Court concluded,
authorized Congress to legislate against private individuals. The
Court observed that "there has never been any doubt of the
power of Congress to impose liability on private persons" under
that Amendment.lo3 The Thirteenth Amendment not only prohibited state laws upholding slavery, Congress was also given the
power "rationally to determine . . . the badges and the incidents
of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into
effective legislation."'" Based upon its Thirteenth Amendment
analysis, the Court held that Congress was "wholly within its
powers under . .. the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause of action for Negro citizens who have been the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action
aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures
to all free men."105 While upholding the statute under the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court expressly chose not to consider its
constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment.lo6
101. Gri5n v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,94 (1971). While technically the Court was
correct, the dissent in Collins suggested that the majority had decided that 8 1985(3) had
been enacted pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651,663 (1951) (Burton, J., Black, J., Douglas, J., dissenting). Similarly, the
court of appeals in Gniffin implied that Collins had construed the statute as enforcing solely
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Griffin,410 F.2d at 819.
102. Griffin,403 U.S. at 95-96.
103. Id at 104-05; see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-40
(1968) (holding that Congress may pass laws regulating the acts of private individuals pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment in order to eliminate all racial discrimination).
104. Gniffin,403 U.S. at 105 (quoting Jones, 392 U.S. at 440).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 107.
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Additionally, the Court stated that the statute protected
rights that did not rest on either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendment and that Congress was empowered to enact such
legislation.lo7 The Court held that the right to interstate travel
was constitutionally protected against private and governmental
interference and that it was recognized as one of the rights and
privileges of national citizenship.log
Having identified two sources of Congress's power to legislate to prohibit private persons from denying constitutional
rights, the Court scrutinized the allegations of the complaint to
see if a proper 5 1985(3) claim had been alleged.lo9 With respect
to the Thirteenth Amendment claim, the plaintiffs had alleged
that one of the rights violated by the conspirators was their right
not to be ens1aved.ll0 The Court held that a conspiracy aimed at
depriving blacks of the rights the laws secured to all free persons
violated the Thirteenth Amendment."' As to the right to interstate travel claim, the Court noted that the plaintiffs alleged that
one of the purposes of the conspiracy was to deprive them of
their right to travel the public highways.l12 This violated the
privileges and immunities section of the Act. Thus, on the basis
of the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiffs had established
a claim under both of the constitutional sources of power identified by the Court.l13
In GrzBn, the Court gave 5 1985(3) a reading more consistent with its legislative history, but nevertheless prevented the
statute from having as broad an impact as was originally
intended. The Court correctly determined that the statute was
not limited by the Fourteenth Amendment's state action constraints. Instead, the statute could be used, as its sponsors
intended, to vindicate privileges and immunities that had as their
source the Thirteenth Amendment or the fundamental rights of
national citizenship. Nevertheless, the Court, concerned that
5 1985(3) could become a general federal tort law, read into the
statute a requirement that the Harris and Collins courts had not.
The GrzBn Court, in order to avoid the broad reach of the language of the statute, replaced the state action requirement with a
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 104.
Id at 105-06; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
Griffin,403 U.S. at 102.
Id at 91.
Id. at 105.
Id at 103.
Id. at 102-03.
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class-based animus element. The Court concluded that, in order
to make out a claim under the statute, a plaintiff had to prove
that there was a "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."u4
The Court declined to decide whether a conspiracy motivated by
invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be
actionable despite evidence that the sponsors of the bill intended
it to reach more than racial classes.115 In fact, the sponsors
made clear that they intended the statute to protect those who
had been deprived of their constitutional rights due to their
political views, religious beliefs, and regional origins, as well as
racial status.
Another difEculty created by the Court's insertion of a
racially based, class animus prerequisite was whether that
requirement solely pertained to claims based on violations of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Arguably, if a claim was based on that
Amendment, some racial animus would have to be demonstrated, since slavery in the United States was based on race.
The question is whether such would be the case if the rights
sought to be protected emanated from other constitutional
-

-

- -

114. Id at 102.
115. Id at 102 n.9. In this regard, the Court made reference to the remarks of Sena-

tor Edmunds wherein he stated that:
We do not undertake in this bi to interfere with what might be called a private
conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or set of men against
another to prevent one getting an indictment in the State courts against men for
burning down his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this man because he was a Democrat, . .. or because
he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a
Vermonter, (which is a pretty painful instance that I have in my mind in the State
of Florida within a few days where a man lost his life for that reason) then this
section would reach it.
CONG.GLOBE,
supra note 22, at 567. Senator Morton remarked:
If there be organizations in any of the States having for their purpose to deny to
any class or condition of men equal protection, to deny to them the equal enjoyment of rights that are secured by the Constitution of the United States, it is the
right and duty of Congress to make such organizations and combinations an
offense against the United States . . . .
Id. app., at 251; see id at 332 (remarks of Rep. Hoar) ("Llarge numbers of our fellow
citizens are deprived of the . ..fundamental rights of citizens . . .because of their attachment to their country, their loyalty to its flag, or because their opinions on questions of
public interest coincide with those of a majority of the American people."); id app., at 311
(remarks of Rep. Maynard) ("[Tlhe unpopular man, the man who entertains odious sentiments, the man whose religion . . .is at variance with the common belief, the man whose
political views do not accord with the generally received opinions of the community in
which he resides, finds his personal security .. .in peril ... ."); see also supra notes 43-47
and accompanying text.
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sources, such as the fundamental rights of national citizenship.l16 The Grzzn Court was silent on this question. It was
this silence as to the types of classes that came within the protection of the statute and whether all claims involving deprivations
of constitutional rights would require class-based animus that
led to further confusion regarding the scope of the statute.

D. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott
In 1983, the Court re-examined 5 1985(3) and attempted to
grapple with some of the issues left unresolved in Grzzn. Specifically, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott,l17
the Court addressed whether classes other than racial groups
were entitled to relief under the statute and what rights, other
than Thirteenth Amendment rights, could form the basis for a
claim under 5 1985(3).11* In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that
a proper claim could be based on non-Thirteenth Amendment
rights (here the First Amendment), but re-injected the state
action requirement of Collins.llg The Court also chose to narrowly limit the types of classes entitled to sue under 5 1985(3).
Scott involved mob violence during the course of a labor
dispute. 120 A construction company (A.A. Cross Construction
Co., Inc.) hired nonunion employees for a construction job in
Port Arthur, Texas. These employees, some of whom were from
outside the Port Arthur area, were threatened by local residents,
who told them that Port Arthur was a union town and that the
company's hiring of nonunion workers would cause trouble.121
A citizens' protest was organized by a local union. Truckloads
of men went to the job site, "assaulted and beat Cross employ116. The Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), a case involving an
indictment under 18 U.S.C. $241 and alleging a conspiracy to deprive blacks of the free
exercise and enjoyment of rights secured to them by the Constitution, held that:
mf the predominant purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise
of that right, then, whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes a proper object of the federal law under which the indictment in
this case was brought.
Id at 760. A similar conclusion should be reached when a claim alleging deprivation of the
right of interstate travel is asserted under $ 1985(3). Otherwise, blacks would have their
rights to such travel protected by the statute, but whites would be at the mercy of the mob
or those who sought to interfere with such rights.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

463

U.S. 825 (1983).

Id at 835.
Id at 834.
Id at 828.
Id
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ees, and burned and destroyed construction equipment."122 several employees filed suit under 5 1985(3), alleging that the mob
had conspired against them because they refused to join a union
and that the conspirators had denied the plaintiffs their First
Amendment associational rights.123
The majority confronted the constitutional issue by discussing whether the statute was limited to protecting Thirteenth
Amendment rights alone.124 The Court re-afErmed Grz&7nYs
holding that the statute protected rights other than Thirteenth
Amendment rights.12' Among the rights protected was the right
of interstate travel. The Court concluded that 5 1985(3) protected those rights from interference by purely private conspiraThe Court was of a different view, however, concerning
whether the statute provided a remedy for the deprivation of
Fourteenth and First Amendment rights in the absence of state
involvement.
With respect to the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, the
majority observed that such claims were only actionable if the
state was involved in the conspiracy or if the aim of the conspiracy was to influence the activity of the state.'=' This conclusion
was based on the Court's declaration that First Amendment
rights were protected against state incursion through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state conduct and not that of
individuals.lZ8 The Court avoided overruling Gri$?nYsholding
that there was no state action requirement in 5 1985(3) by distinguishing the rights infringed upon in Grzzn from those asserted
in Scott. The Court stated that the rights involved in Grzsn,
Thirteenth Amendment rights and rights of national citizenship,
were properly protected against private conspiracies, but the
Scott Court held that GnPn had not categorically stated "that
even when the alleged conspiracy is aimed at a right that is by
definition a right that is only against state interference the plaintiff. . . need not prove . . . state involvement of some
While the majority did acknowledge that the complaint in Grif122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 827-28.
Id at 828.
Id at 832-33.
Id at 832.
Id at 832-33.
Id at 830-31.
Id
Id at 833.
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fin had alleged a deprivation of First Amendment rights, the
action was not sustained on that basis.130
After resurrecting the state action requirement of Collins,
the Court turned its attention to the types of classes protected
under the statute. With respect to the categories of classes protected under the statute, the majority in Scott was of a mind to
limit it solely to racial groups, but chose not to go that far.131
The Court opined, without citation to the legislative history or
its own precedent, that the "predominant purpose of § 1985(3)
was to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their
s~pporters."'~~
The Court acknowledged that there was evidence that the statute was designed to have a broader reach, but
declined to give that evidence any weight.133 Furthermore, the
majority stated that the GrzBn Court was aware of this evidence
and did not base its definition of the categories of classes protected by the statute on it.134The Court concluded that even if
the statute was designed to reach conspiracies "aimed at any
class . . . on account of its political views or activities, or at any
of the classes posited by Senator Edmunds, we find no convincing support in the legislative history . . . that the provision was
intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others
on account of their economic views, status, or a~tivities."'~'
Thus, the Court held that 8 1985(3) could not reach conspiracies
motivated by economic animus.136
130. Id While the Court may have been correct regarding the treatment of the First
Amendment claims in G n s n , the dissent in Collinr was prepared to find a violation of
5 1985(3) based on the First Amendment in the absence of state involvement of any kind.
Collins v. Hardpan, 341 U.S. 651, 663 (1951).
131. The Court stated: "mt is a close question whether 5 1985(3) was intended to
reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause, most notably Republicans." Scott, 463 U.S. at 836.
132. Id
133. The Court quoted Senator Edmunds' statement that "if a conspiracy were
formed against a man 'because he was a Democrat. .or because he was a Catholic, .. .or
because he was a Vermonter . . . then this section could reach it.' " Id at 837; see also
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Although Senator Edmunds was the Senate
floor manager of the bid, the Court refused to accord his views any weight because
"5 1985(3). .[in] its present form, was proposed, debated and adopted. .. [inthe House],
and the Senate made only technical changes to the bid." Scott, 463 U.S.at 837.
134. Scott, 463 U.S. at 837. In fact, the reason for the GnBn Court's refusal to
decide this issue was that it was not necessary, based on the facts of that case, to reach it.
The G n s n Court stated that "[wle need not decide, given the facts of this case, whether a
conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be
actionable under. . . 5 1985(3)." Grifiin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 n.9 (1971).
135. Scott, 463 U.S. at 837.
136. Id at 838.

.

.
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The dissent took the majority to task for its conclusions
that the statute had a state action requirement under certain circumstances and that it was designed to reach only racial classes.
First, the dissent relied extensively on the legislative history to
refute the majority's conclusion regarding state a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~
According to the dissent, the Republican supporters of the statute held two views of Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment.138The radical Republicans believed that the Fourteenth Amendment had altered the balance of power between
the states and the national government and that Congress was
empowered to enact legislation to protect life, liberty, and property. 139 The moderate Republicans thought that the Fourteenth
Amendment's G u a l Protection Clause implied that the states
had an alknative duty to afford equal protection.14 When the
state neglected or refused to provide equal protection, Congress
was empowered to step in and punish all persons, private or official, who deprived another of constitutional rights.141 The dissent believed that these comments, and others relied upon in its
opinion,142 supported the conclusion that the statute was
designed to protect persons who were the victims of "private
conspiracies motivated by the intent to interfere in the equal
exercise and enjoyment of their legal rights"143 and that Congress did not intend any state action req~irement.'~~
Having concluded that there was no state action requirement in § 1985(3), the dissent sharply criticized the majority for
adopting a prereq$site of state involvement virtually identical to
137. Id at 841-47 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id at 842-43.
139. Id at 842; see, ag., CONG.GLOBE,supra note 22, app., at 73 (remarks of Rep.
Blair); id app., at 85 (remarks of Rep. Bigham); id app., at 141 (remarks of Rep.
Shanks); see also supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
140. Scott, 463 U.S. at 843 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing CONG.GLOBE,supra note 22, app., at 153 (remarks of Rep. Garfield));
see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
141. Scott, 463 U.S. at 843 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J.,

dissenting).
142. The dissent relied on the additional comments of Representative Garfield,
CONG.GLOBE,supra note 22, app., at 153 (an equal protection claim is established when
the state refuses to enforce the provisions of its own laws); Representative Shellabarger, id.
at 478 (the object of the statute was to prevent deprivations which attacked the equality of
rights of American citizens); and Representative Willard, id. app., at 188 (the statute was
designed to punish a denial of equality). See Scott, 463 U.S. at 843-46 (Blackmun, J.,
Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143. Scott, 463 U.S. at 847 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
144. Id
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that of the Collins Court.145The dissent also noted that the Harris Court had held that the statute reached private conspira~ies."+~
Additionally, they stated that Grzzn expressly rejected
any suggestion found in Collins that there was a state action
requirement in § 1985(3).14'
Finally, the dissent disparaged the majority's refusal to
extend the protections of 1985(3) beyond racial classes.148
They acknowledged that the types of classes covered by the statUnder their reading of the language of
ute were un~1ear.l~~
1985(3), however, it could include a wide variety of class-based
denials of equal protection and equal enjoyment of rights.
Reviewing the legislative history, the dissent reached the conclusion that the forty-second Congress viewed the Klan as a political organization whose violence was premised on the political
viewpoints of its victims.150The Klan's goal was to overthrow
the Reconstruction policy of Congress in order to place Democrats in office. Blacks were clearly victimized by the Klan's use
of terror, but according to the dissent, this was because of the
identification of blacks with the Republican Party and
Reconstr~ction.~~~
Based on the legislative history, the dissent was of the view
145. Id at 848-49.
146. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1882) ("Under . . . [S) 1985(3)] private persons are liable to punishment for conspiring to deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws. . . ."); c j United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 76 (1951) (plurality
opinion) (!indig similar conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. 8 241, reaches private action).
147. Scott, 463 U.S. at 849-50 (Blackmun, J., Breman, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). In rejecting a state action requirement, the Gnfin Court relied upon other
provisions of the Ku Klux Klan Act and the legislative history. The Court postulated three
possible forms for a state action limitation and concluded that each had been covered under
other provisions of the Act. With respect to a possible requirement that the action of the
conspirators be under color of state law, the Court concluded that section one of the Ku
Klux Klan Act (currently codified as 42 U.S.C. S) 1983 (1988)) covered that situation, and
that to read such a requirement into S) 1985(3) would deprive that section of all independent effect. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971). Similarly, another clause of
S) 1985(3) provided a remedy where the conspirators sought to interfere with or influence
state authorities. Finally, section three of the Act provided for military action at the command of the president where massive private lawlessness.rendered state authorities powerless. Id at 98-99. Thus, from a statutory construction analysis, the Court found no basis
for implying a state action limitation on S) 1985(3). The legislative history that the Gr@n
Court reviewed led to a similar conclusion. Id. at 100-01.
148. Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 (Blackmun, J., Breman, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 850-51; see also supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
151. Scott, 463 U.S. at 850 n.15 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
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that Congress intended to provide a federal remedy for all
classes whose rights were violated in circumstances similar to
those of the victims of Klan vi01ence.l~~They contended that
the forty-second Congress enacted 8 1985(3) because of its perception that the Klan was committing atrocities against persons
who, "largely because of their political affiliation, were unable to
demand protection from local law enforcement official^.""^
Accordingly, the statute wak designed to provide a remedy "to
any class of persons, whose beliefs or associations placed them in
danger of not receiving equal protection of the laws from local
a ~ t h o r i t i e s . " The
~ ~ ~ dissent concluded that although "certain
class traits, such as race, religion, sex, and national origin" met
this requirement per se, "other traits also may implicate the
functional concerns" of the statute "in particular situation^."'^^
Thus, the dissent would have found the nonunion employees in
Scott a cognizable class under 5 1985(3).
On one hand, the Scott Court upheld the holding of G n z n
that non-Thirteenth Amendment rights were actionable under
5 1985(3). This view of the statute is supported by the legislative
history wherein the sponsors of the bill stated that their intent
was to protect all privileges and immunities that a citizen had
under any provision of the Constit~tion."~By requiring state
action when certain constitutional rights were alleged to have
been infringed upon, however, the Scott Court resurrected Collins and threw the continued vitality of the statute into question.
The G n z n Court had demonstrated adequately that when
the statute was read in its original context, it became obvious
that a state action limitation would make 5 1985(3) superfluous."' The legislative history demonstrates that the cause for
Congress's concern was not that state officials were actively
denying constitutional rights. Instead, Congress was concerned
that private actors had taken the law into their own hands and,
thereby, prevented state officials from affording equal protection
to all classes.M8These persons, at times acting under the aegis of
the Klan, used intimidation, terror, and violence in pursuit of
their political objective's. Thus, the Scott dissent correctly con-

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

--

Id. at 851.
Id. at 853.
Id
Id.
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 98-99, 100-01 (1971).
See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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cluded that the purpose of the statute was to provide a remedy
against private individuals who infringed on constitutional
rights. Additionally, the dissent correctly described the factual
situation in the South in 1871 wherein blacks, and others with
unpopular views, were unable to acquire protection from local
law enforcement, either because the Klan had entered into a
tacit agreement with the state officials, or because they were
powerless to stop the Klan. Thus, the primary purpose of the
statute was to provide a remedy against the acts of private persons, and not against the acts of the state.
Finally, the Scott Court's refusal to extend the scope of
classes protected under the statute is inconsistent with the legislative history. The forty-second Congress was concerned with
attacks against blacks, their supporters, Republicans, religious
figures, northerners, southern union sympathizers, and'symbols
of the federal government.15g There was ample evidence that
Congress was concerned with the deprivation of rights against a
wide variety of individuals, and the Court in Harris had so con~ 1 u d e d . Thus,
l ~ ~ a proper view of the statute would be that when
a group is attacked or its members deprived of their constitutional rights because of an identifiable group characteristic such
as race, sex, national origin, or political views that the conspirators oppose, 5 1985(3) should provide a remedy. Additionally,
where a conspiracy seeks to deny to others their constitutionally
secured right to interstate travel, or any other fundamental right
of national citizenship, no showing of class-based animus should
be required.161

E. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
In the October 1991 Term, the Supreme Court will have
another opportunity to clarify or to restrict further the reach of
8 1985(3).162In Bray, the court of appeals afErmed the district
court's issuance of a permanent injunction under 8 1985(3)
preventing Operation Rescue and several individual members
from blockading, trespassing, or otherwise preventing access to
159. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
160. The Harris Court stated that "[u]nder [§ 1985(3)] it would be an offence for two
or more white persons to conspire. ..for the purpose of depriving another white person of
the equal protection of the laws." United States v. Hams, 106 U.S.629, 641 (1882).
161. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.745, 760 (1966).
162. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990),
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abortion fa~i1ities.l~~
The Fourth Circuit also upheld the district
court's finding that gender-based discrimination satisfied the
class-based animus requirement of 1985(3) and that Operation
Rescue and the other defendants had violated the right of
women to travel inter~tate.'~~
In Bray, the Court is presented with several options. One,
it could declare that GrzBn was decided incorrectly and hold
that Collins's state action requirement applies to all claims
asserted under § 1985(3). Two, it could hold that women or
women seeking an abortion do not constitute a valid class for
$ 1985(3) purposes. Three, it could undercut the right of
women to an abortion by ruling that § 1985(3) was not intended
to protect women seeking an abortion, since the evil to be remedied by Congress was Klan terror against blacks and their supporters. However, a careful review of the facts presented by the
case, the legislative history of 1985(3), and the Court's precedent under that statute should result in the affirmance of the
opinions of the lower courts.
In the district court, the plaintiffs included nine clinics that
provided abortions and abortion counselling to residents of the
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area.165Five organizations also
sued on behalf of their members. Among the organizational
plaintiffs were the National Organization for Women and
Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Operation Rescue and several of its members were named as defendants. The district court found that Operation Rescue was an
unincorporated association whose members oppose abortion and
its legalization.
The organization and its members would
blockade an abortion clinic's entrances and exits, thereby effeccert granted sub nom Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 11 1 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
Among the issues presented by the petition for certiorari are the following:
1. Whether women seeking abortions constitute a class for the purpose of the classbased animus requirement of § 1985(3).
2. Whether opposition to abortion is discrimination per se against women for the
purpose of satisfying the class-based animus requirement of the statute.
3. Whether purely private actors who hinder access to abortion facilities violate the
constitutional right to interstate travel because some of the facility's patients travel
interstate.
163. National Org. for Women, 914 F.2d at 585.
164. Id. at 584-85.
165. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 (E.D.
Va. 1989), af'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cu. 1990), cert. granted sub nom Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 11 1 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
166. Id.
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tively closing the facility and denying women access.167
The district court found that the purpose of Operation Rescue's blockading of abortion clinics was to disrupt operations at
those facilities and to cause the clinic to cease operation entirely.
By disrupting these clinics, the defendants hoped to "prevent
abortions," "dissuade women from seeking a clinic's abortion
services," and "to impress upon members of society the . . .
intensity of their anti-abortion views."168 The court found that
the practice of preventing access to these facilities could be
harmful to the health of women seeking or undergoing abortionrelated treatment.169 In addition to the risk to the physical
health of the patients, the court concluded that these blockades
could impose stress, anxiety, and mental harm to patients or
potential patients.170
The court also found that substantial numbers of women
seeking abortions in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area
traveled interstate to reach the clinics.171 The court held that the
blockading of abortion clinics had the effect of "obstructing and
interfering with the interstate travel of these women."172 The
court further found that Operation Rescue was able to close
down clinics notwithstanding the efforts of the local police to
The court found that
prevent the clinics from being c10sed.l~~
167. Id
168. Id. at 1488.
169. The court found that for some women who elect to undergo an abortion, a pre-

abortion laminaria is inserted to achieve proper cervical dilation. In order to avoid infection, such devices must be removed in a timely fashion. If the defendants closed a facility,
women seeking laminaria removal would be placed at risk or would have to seek services
elsewhere. Id at 1489. There were numerous economic and psychological barriers to
obtaining these services elsewhere. The court found that indigent or impecunious patients
were provided abortion services at nominal fees by the clinics, whereas hospitals would
require insurance or full payment. Id Thus, for these women, Operation Rescue's blockade of an abortion facility could impose serious health risks.
170. Id
171. Approximately 20-30% of the patients served at the Commonwealth Women's

Clinic in Falls Church, Virginia, came from out of state. The records of these patients
revealed they had permanent residences in Maryland, the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, New Jersey, New York, and Florida. A majority of the
patients at the Hillview Women's Center in Forestville, Maryland, traveled interstate to
reach the clinic. Id.
172. Id.
173. To support this conclusion, the court relied on trial testimony relating to the

closing of the Commonwealth Women's Clinic. The clinic had been the object of Operation Rescue's blockades on almost a weekly basis for five years prior to the litigation. On
October 29, 1988, the clinic was closed by the blockade despite the efforts of the Falls
Church Police Department to keep the facility open. The testimony revealed that the
department consisted of thirty deputized officers. On the date in question, the blockaders
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"[llimited police department resources combined with the typical absence of any advance notice identifying a target clinic renders it difficult for local police to prevent rescuers from closing a
facility."174
After determining that the defendants engaged in conduct
that could result in a deprivation of constitutional rights, the
court analyzed the facts to ascertain whether a 5 1985(3) violation was established. The court found that gender-based discrimination satisfied the class-based discriminatory animus
element of the statute.175Thus, a conspiracy to deprive women
seeking abortions of their right to travel interstate to obtain such
services was actionable under the statute.176Based on its factual
findings, the court concluded that the defendants had engaged in
a conspiracy for the purpose of depriving women seeking abortions or related medical services of the right to travel interstate.177 The court further found that since the right to travel
interstate is protected against purely private as well as governmental interference, there was no need to show state a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~
Although the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had violated the privacy rights of women seeking abortions, the court
declined to base its decision on that ground.179 Having f o u d
outnumbered the police officers, and, even though 240 arrests were made, the clinic was
closed for more than six hours. Id. at 1489 n.4.
174. Id.
175. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that the majority of courts have
concluded that gender-based animus satisfies the conspiracy requirement of the statute. Id.
at 1492;see, ag., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988); Buschi v. Kirven, 775
F.2d 1240,1257 (4th Cir. 1985); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577,581 (E.D. Pa.
1989); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1259
(S.D.N.Y.), a r d , 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Ci. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Lie, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 @.
Or. 1988).
176. National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1493.
177. Id at 1492-93.
178. Id
179. The plaintiffs contended that the conspiracy infringed on the constitutional right
of women to obtain an abortion. The court stated that "[wlhere the claimed abortion right
is a penumbral privacy right emanating from the First Amendment, state action must be
shown to support a claim under Section 1985(3)." Id at 1493 n.11; accord United Bhd. of
Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S.825, 833 (1983); see also New York State Nat'l
Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating requirement that
state action must be demonstrated when the right asserted is a guarantee against government interference), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). The district court acknowledged
that there was authority for the proposition that where conspirators render local police
officials "incapable of securing equal access to medical treatment for women who choose
abortions," the state action requirement is satisfied. National Org. for Women, 726 F.
Supp. at 1493 n.11; see also Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366,
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that the plaintiffs had established a violation of 8 1985(3), the
court issued a permanent injunction against the defendants
preventing them from further blockades of certain Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area abortion clinics.1s0
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's opinion and
the issuance of the permanent injunction. The circuit court
agreed that gender-based animus satisfied the purpose element of
8 1985(3) and stated that such a conclusion was consistent with
the law of other circuits.181 The circuit court also upheld the
district court's conclusion that blocking access to medical services provided by abortion facilities that serve an interstate clientele violates the constitutional right to interstate trave1.lS2
The granting of the petition for certiorari in Bray presents
the Court with the opportunity either to interpret 5 1985(3) consistently with the intent of the forty-second Congress and the
Court's own precedent or to unsettle an entire body of law.
Essentially, there are two major issues presented by this case.
First, whether women or women seeking an abortion constitute
384 (1979) ("mf private persons take conspiratorial action that prevents or hinders the
constituted authorities of any State from giving or securing equal treatment, the private
persons would cause those authorities to violate the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."); c j
Scott, 463 U.S. at 853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Congress intended to provide a remedy
to any class of persons, whose beliefs or associations placed them in danger of not receiving
equal protection of the laws from local authorities."). The district court declined to reach
the merits of this argument, in part because of its conclusion that the right to an abortion is
in flux. National Org.for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1494; see, ag.,Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,518 (1989) ("We have not refrained from reconsideration of a
prior construction of the Constitution that has proved 'unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.' We think the Roe trimester framework falls into that category.") (citations omitted); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 421
(1983); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
180. National Org.for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1496-97. Other courts have similarly
enjoined blockades of abortion clinics. See, eg., Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 432
(N.D.N.Y. 1989); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 704 F.
Supp. 1247, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577,589 (E.D.
Pa. 1989); Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 382-83 (D.
Conn. 1989); Northeast Women's Ctr. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1159 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
181. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585-86 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. granted sub nom ,Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991);
see, ag., New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Teny, 886 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434'(7th Cir.
1988); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15,20 (lst Cir. 1984); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979); Conroy v.
Conroy, 575 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cu. 1978).
182. National Otg for Women, 914 F.2d at 585; accord New York State Nat'l Org.for
Women, 886 F.2d at 1360-61.
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a proper class for protection under 5 1985(3). Second, whether
the statute was designed to provide a remedy for deprivations of
the fundamental rights of national citizenship.
Grzzn held that an essential element of a 5 1985(3) claim
was that the defendants must act upon some class-based, invidiously discriminatory basis.lS3 Because that case involved a conspiracy by a group of whites against blacks traveling on the
highways of Mississippi, the Court chose not to speculate as to
the parameters of the class-based animus requirement. The
majority in Scott opined that only racial classes were protected
under the statute, but declined to limit the reach of 5 1985(3) so
narrowly.lS4 The dissent in Scott stated that a conspiracy
against women would be actionable under the statute,lS5and a
number of circuits have so concluded.186 A possible rule as to
the types of classes that would come within the purview of
5 1985(3) would be that where the class consists of members
who have been subjected to discriminatory treatment as a group,
the class-based requirement would be satisfied. Clearly, women
as a group have been subjected to discriminatory treatment in
many different contexts.lS7 As Justice Brennan stated in
Frontiero :
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of "romantic
paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage.
183. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
184. Scott, 463 U.S. at 836-37.
185. Id. at 853 (Blackrnun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting).
186. See supra note 181.
187. In 1872, the Court upheld an Illinois statute prohibiting women from practicing
law. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). During the Burger years, the
Court struck down a number of gender-based discriminatory classifications as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, eg., Califano v. Westcott,
443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (difference in benefits based on gender of unemployed spouse);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979) (state law giving unwed mothers, but not
unwed fathers, the right to prohibit adoption); O n v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,271 (1979) (requiring only husbands to pay alimony); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,204 (1977) (genderbased survival benefits under the Social Security Act); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17
(1975) (differences in termination of child support based on chid's sex); Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 639 (1975) (gender-based survivor's benefits under the Social
Security Act); Frontiero v. Richardson, 41 1 U.S. 677, 678 (1973) (federal statute requiring
women officers in armed services to prove actual dependency of spouses in order to qualify
for increased benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,77 (1971) (mandatory preference to men
over women in the appointment of estate administrators).
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....
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books
gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions
between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th
century the position of women in our society was, in many
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War
slave codes.lS8
Thus, given the long, sordid history of sex-based discrimination against women as a group, which is analogous to racebased discrimination against blacks, a statute designed to provide a remedy for deprivations of the constitutional rights of the
latter should be able to shelter the former from the same types of
conduct.
An alternative theory that could result in an affirmance of
the lower court's opinion in Bray was suggested in Scott. The
majority, expressing doubts as to whether the statute was
designed to protect classes other than blacks and their supporters, noted that there was legislative history to support the view
that 5 1985(3) had a broader reach and implied that there was
some indication that the statute could reach conspiracies aimed
at a class on account of its political views or activities.lg9 The
Scott dissent was willing to go further and explicitly hold that
the statute was designed to protect those victimized because of
their political viewpoint.lgOIn Justice Blackmun's view, the statute was designed to protect "all classes that seek to exercise their
legal rights in unprotected circumstances similar to those of the
victims of Klan violence."1g1 Thus, under this reading of the
statute, a class based on unpopular political views would be
appropriate for 8 1985(3)'s protection.
Utilizing the alternative political conspiracy theory, women
seeking an abortion could constitute a proper class in Bray. In
Bray, the Operation Rescue blockaders formed their conspiracy
in reaction and opposition to the right of women to seek an abortion. But for the women's political view that they had a constitutional right to seek an abortion, Operation Rescue would not
have formed a conspiracy to prevent this class of women from
gaining access to the abortion clinics. It is because of their political viewpoint, unpopular with the Operation Rescue activists,
188.
189.
190.
191.

Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85.
United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1983).
Id at 850-51 (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 851.
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that these women have been singled out as victims by the blockaders. Just as the Klan used terror tactics to prevent blacks
from exercising their newly acquired constitutional rights, Operation Rescue seeks through intimidation to accomplish the same
end with respect to women seeking an abortion.
Under the political conspiracy theory, the plaintiffs would
have to show that they could not obtain adequate protection
from the local police forces. The Scott dissenters stated that
Congress intended under 5 1985(3) to provide a remedy to "any
class of persons, whose beliefs or associations placed them in
danger of not receiving equal protection of the laws from local
authorities."lg2 In Justice Blackmun's view, a plaintiff would
not have to allege neglect on the part of state officers to enforce
the law equally, rather an inference would be raised that there
was ineffective state enforcement whenever a conspiracy
involved invidious animus towards a class of persons.lg3 This
would be especially true when the victimizers targeted a group
because of its unpopular political views. This requirement is met
in Bray. As the district court found, the local police departments were unable to prevent the clinics' closure by the blockaders. In fact, the police on many occasions were outnumbered by
the activists.lg4 Thus, the local police were unable to prevent the
blockaders from denying women seeking abortions access to the
clinics. The facts in Bray are similar to those that confronted
the forty-second Congress and prompted it to enact 5 1985(3):
the inability or unwillingness of the local law enforcement entities to protect blacks and others in the exercise of their constitutional rights. Therefore, the remedy created to address a similar
factual situation should be available to those whose rights are
now violated by Operation Rescue's attempt to replace government by law with mob rule.
An alternative theory to avoid the class-based animus prerequisite altogether would be to argue that where a 5 1985(3)
claim is based on a fundamental right of national citizenship, no
discriminatory motivation is required. This rule would be consistent with the legislative history since many proponents of the
statute stated that i-twas designed to protect all classes of citi192. Id at 853.
193. Id at 851.
194. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.
(E.D. Va. 1989).
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zens.lg5 Such a rule would also be consistent with Harris,
wherein the Court stated that the criminal counterpart to
5 1985(3) could reach a private conspiracy by whites to deprive
other whites of constitutional rights.lg6 Similarly, the Guest
Court expressly held in a case involving a conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. 5 241 to deprive others of the right to interstate travel
that there was no need to show racial discrimination when that
right of national citizenship was infringed upon by others.lg7
This view of the statute would rectify the confusion engendered
by the Grzzn Court's failure to distinguish claims brought
under 5 1985(3) alleging Thirteenth Amendment violations and
claims alleging deprivations of the fundamental rights of
national citizenship.
Although the court may disagree as to whether women, or
women with unpopular political views in the minds of Operation
Rescue's adherents, constitute an appropriate class for 5 1985(3)
purposes, there should be unanimity regarding the protection of
a fundamental right of national citizenship. The Grzzn Court
expressly recognized that the statute protected the right of interstate travel and that Congress may legislate to prevent both private and governmental interference with that right.lg8 The Scott
Court afiirmed that 5 1985(3) protected the right to interstate
travel.lg9 In Bray, the district court found that a large percentage of women who sought treatment at Washington, D.C., metropolitan area clinics travelled interstate to obtain those
services.200The court further found that the actions of Operation Rescue in blockading abortion clinics interfered with the
right of women to travel interstate.201In light of the Supreme
Court's prior rulings and the district court's factual findings,
there should be little doubt that 5 1985(3) protects the constitutional right of women to travel interstate.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the legislative history and the Court's own precedent, the Fourth Circuit's afiirmance of the district court's issu-

Va.

195. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
196. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 641 (1882).
197. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,760 (1966).
198. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971).
199. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1983).
200. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.,Supp. 1483, 1489 (E.D.
1989).
201. Id. at 1493.
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ance of a permanent injunction against Operation Rescue shoula
be upheld because the factual situation presented by the antiabortion activists is similar to that of the South in 1871. Then,
as now, massive numbers of private individuals formed organizations and took actions designed to frustrate and set at naught
constitutional rights. Then, the Klan sought to prevent blacks
and others from exercising a host of rights, including those protected under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the fundamental rights of national citizenship.
Now, individuals militantly opposed to abortions have formed
organizations designed to frustrate the right of women to cross
state lines for the purposes of seeking abortions. In 1871, the
local law enforcement officers stood powerless before the wrath
of the Klan, proving completely ineffective in preventing the terror that the Klan visited upon its victims and, at times, tacitly
supporting the objectives of the Klan. Similarly, due to the massive numbers of persons blockading abortion clinics under Operation Rescue's aegis and the passions aroused by the abortion
issue and Operation Rescue's tactics, local law enforcement
officers are unable or unwilling to prevent them from denying
access to abortion facilities to women who have traveled interstate to utilize those clinics. Thus, both the factual situation at
the time of the enactment of 8 1985(3) and that presented by
Operation Rescue's obstruction of access to abortion clinics
require a similar remedy. Section 1985(3) was designed for that
purpose.
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